







A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments
Tasos Kalandrakis
Working Paper No. 47




We develop a theory of the emergence of minority and majority governments in multiparty
parliamentary systems using a canonical non-cooperative bargaining model and assuming a pol-
icy space of arbitrary ﬁnite dimension, any number of political parties, and a general class of
preferences over the government agreement space. Only majority governments form in the ab-
sence of signiﬁcant political disagreement. Generically, minority governments form with positive
probability when parties represented in parliament are ideologically polarized (or when utility
from holding cabinet oﬃce is small relative to partisan political disagreement). Rather than
being paradoxical, minority governments are a regular equilibrium phenomenon.
1 Introduction
The formation of minority governments in parliamentary systems constitutes one of the
most intriguing paradoxes in the study of coalition building. Parliamentary systems operate on
the principle that the executive’s survival in oﬃce hinges on the (tacit) support of a majority in
parliament. Yet, by deﬁnition, minority governments obtain majority support by allocating cabinet
positions to a set of parties with only a minority of seats in parliament. Furthermore, a large frac-
tion of coalition governments during the post WWII era (over one third in Western Europe) were
minority governments, while in certain countries such as Denmark or Norway, minority govern-
ments have been the default cabinet type. Why do political parties support (or tolerate) minority
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1governments without receiving cabinet portfolios? Our goal in this study is to develop a parsi-
monious, yet general theory that accounts for variation in the incidence of minority governments
across parliamentary systems. This theory is distinguished from much of the existing literature due
to the simultaneous incorporation of three requirements we deem essential for a theory of minority
governments. In the remainder of this ﬁrst section, we ﬁrst motivate these requirements, then
describe the main ﬁndings and relate them to the literature on government formation.
Any attempt to understand minority governments brings us squarely in the realm of coali-
tion theories and the literature spawned by William Riker, 1962, and his ‘size principle,’ the propo-
sition that observed coalitions should be the smallest necessary to win and no larger. An important
consideration in applying this dictum is that care should be taken when it comes to the criterion
used for measuring the size of winning coalitions. While in abstract theories of coalition forma-
tion we may deﬁne the winning coalition as the set of voters or supporters that back a particular
agreement, that criterion has no bite in the case of government formation: as long as we maintain
the assumption that cabinets must enjoy the (tacit) support of a majority in parliament, then all
parliamentary governments are majority governments according to that measure of coalition size.
Instead, for the purposes of government formation, coalition size has to be measured on the basis
of the observed agreement, in particular by summing the parliamentary representation of parties
that receive cabinet portfolios. Thus, an essential aspect of any model of minority governments is
that (a) the portfolio allocation can be inferred from the government formation agreement.
Government formation agreements determine both the allocation of cabinet posts among
parties as well as the policy to be pursued by the new cabinet. While the electorate may not have
preferences over the portfolio allocation per se, parties and individuals within parties certainly
compete with each other over the allocation of cabinet posts. In particular, it is natural to assume
that political parties desire larger fractions of cabinet portfolios, all else equal. This is an essential
assumption in a theory of minority governments as such governments are paradoxical only if cabinet
positions are desirable per se. We thus impose a second requirement that (b) a political party’s
utility increases with larger share of cabinet portfolios for any given public policy pursued by the
cabinet. We emphasize that this assumption does not preclude the possibility that parties’ utilities
from cabinet oﬃce may vary across countries, or over time, nor does this assumption speak in any
way to the relative signiﬁcance of parties’ oﬃce and policy aspirations.
The third requirement we impose is to (c) avoid dimensionality or other a priori restrictions
on the agreement space over which political parties bargain. First, this requirement ensures that our
2conclusions do not rely on the common but special assumption of a one dimensional policy space,
which typically entails equilibrium properties that do not obtain in higher dimensions. We also avoid
ad hoc a priori restrictions on the types of agreements that can be attained by particular coalitions,
modeling the set of feasible proposals as a continuum. In the present analysis, a formateur that
would barely lose an investiture vote due to the objection of one of the intended coalition partners,
can achieve the formation of this cabinet by granting an extra concession (in the form of cabinet
portfolios or policies) to the objecting party.
Can we obtain equilibrium minority governments if we impose requirements (a), (b), and
(c) above? We show that the answer to this question is almost always in the aﬃrmative: minority
governments emerge with positive probability when political disagreement or policy polarization
among bargaining parties is marked relative to the importance of utility obtained by holding cabinet
oﬃce. On the other hand, when policy disagreement is limited, only majority governments form.
Note that we qualify the statement of the result by ‘almost always’ because it is possible to construct
otherwise unspectacular examples in which the stated comparative static does not hold. Yet, in
Proposition 2 we show that these examples constitute singularities that obtain only for knife-
edge conﬁgurations of parameters. Otherwise, the conclusion holds independent of the number of
political parties represented in parliament or the number of dimensions of the underlying policy
space. In the discussion following Proposition 2 we review systematic empirical evidence and
stylized facts about the incidence of minority governments that corroborate these ﬁndings.
The mechanism that links policy disagreement with minority governments can be best
understood by considering the trade-oﬀ faced by the intended coalition partners of a formateur
party. When political parties are ideologically polarized, any party rejecting a proposed government
agreement faces the risk that a coalition excluding this party will form instead, implementing a
distant policy at the wrong side of the ideological spectrum. Thus, holding the value of cabinet
posts ﬁxed, policy disagreement reduces parties’ bargaining power and makes it more likely for a
formateur to extract the consent of other parties without oﬀering them any cabinet posts. More
generally, minority governments can be thought to emerge when a formateur’s party is strong vis a
vis its coalition partners, in equilibrium. In that spirit and under special assumptions, in Result 1
we show that such governments emerge for a larger range of the model’s parameters when parties are
more impatient. Thus, although these governments are often associated with impaired support for
the government’s legislative program in parliament, in the present analysis minority governments
indicate a relatively strong formateur party capable of mustering support from parties outside the
3cabinet in order to implement the associated policy agreements. In that regard, the present study
adds to the arguments of a number of scholars, e.g., Strom, 1990, Sened, 1995, Tsebelis, 1995, etc.,
who similarly conclude that minority governments can be stable and viable governing solutions.
Before we proceed with the analysis, we review related theoretical contributions with an
emphasis on aspects in which they diﬀer from the present study. Minority governments have been
associated with policy polarization in one of the earliest accounts of the phenomenon to appear in
the comparative politics literature by Dodd, 1976. In his account, though, the connection between
policy polarization and minority governments is almost assumed. It amounts to an inability of po-
larized parties to participate in the same cabinet. Furthermore, minority governments of that ﬂavor
are expected to be of short duration (e.g., Powell, 1982, page 142). In a seminal contribution for the
study of minority governments Kaare Strom, 1984, 1990, provided an explanation for these cabinets
based on the inter-temporal trade-oﬀs parties face when considering their options for government
participation. A key assumption in Strom’s argument is that gaining oﬃce immediately may not be
optimal for parties which, by “deferring gratiﬁcation” of their oﬃce aspirations, may avoid costly
electoral consequences associated with holding cabinet portfolios. Thus, it may be rational to allow
a minority government to form – particularly if parties are patient, have opportunities to inﬂuence
policy in the legislature even if not present in the cabinet, and face competitive elections.
Perhaps the earliest formal theory result associating policy polarization with minority gov-
ernments is provided by Itai Sened, 1995, 1996. He considers a model with both policies and cabinet
portfolio allocations and shows that equilibrium minority governments emerge when led by a large,
centrally located party and when other parties are signiﬁcantly ideologically polarized (Proposition
2, page 292 in Sened, 1995, and Proposition 3, page 361, in Sened, 1996). The main diﬀerences
between Sened’s theory and the present study are, ﬁrst, that he uses a cooperative solution concept
while the present analysis is non-cooperative; second, that he assumes that parties incur a policy
related payoﬀ (a cost in Sened’s terminology) only when participating in government while policy
payoﬀs from the implemented government agreement obtain in the present analysis whether the
party receives cabinet portfolios or not; and, ﬁnally, that in the present study minority governments
may emerge even if there exists no party in a central dominant location – as is the case in Example
1.
The bargaining process of government formation we assume was introduced in political
science by Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. They study a divide-the-dollar game, which we may interpret
as a game for the division of cabinet portfolios, and obtain only minimum winning coalitions in
4equilibrium. Thus their model produces no minority governments, a ﬁnding that is consistent with
the present analysis since there is no policy disagreement in their model. In a similar bargaining
space, Baron, 1998, considers a dynamic model with an exogenous random status quo in which
minority governments are preferred by the formateur but do not form in equilibrium. In contrast,
Kalandrakis, 2004, 2007, obtains minority allocations in a divide-the-dollar game when the status
quo is endogenous. Baron, 1991, considers bargaining over a two-dimensional ideological space, but
his analysis is silent on the emergence of equilibrium minority/majority cabinets, as he does not
make portfolio allocations an explicit choice among bargaining parties.
The assumption that parties only care about policies and cabinet portfolios accrue no oﬃce-
holding payoﬀ is made by Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990, Laver and Shepsle, 1990, and Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1990, who propose theories of government formation premised on cooperative solution
concepts. All three contributions reach the conclusion that minority governments may emerge under
conditions that ensure the policies pursued by these cabinets are invulnerable or core policies.1
While Laver and Schoﬁeld assume that bargaining parties may consider the entire range of possible
policy agreements, Laver and Shepsle and Austen-Smith and Banks restrict possible policy and
portfolio allocations to a ﬁnite number of what they deem credible policy alternatives for each
coalition. Thus existence of a core or stable government is more likely under their assumptions,
but such core points, with or without minority cabinets, are not guaranteed to exist in the absence
of exogenous restrictions on feasible policies.2
A number of authors consider noncooperative government formation models with assump-
tions related to those in the present study. Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, consider a model of
both elections and post-election bargaining that takes place among three parties that must both
split cabinet portfolios and determine a policy drawn from a one dimensional space. In their model,
minority governments are not obtained in equilibrium because the authors assume at the outset
that policy disagreement is small relative to the spoils of oﬃce, although minority governments
emerge in bargaining subgames that are not reached in equilibrium. Related three party, one di-
mensional models are analyzed by Crombez, 1996, who associates minority governments with the
size of the median party, by Kalandrakis, 2000, and by Cho, 2005, the latter model being dynamic
with an endogenous status quo and elections. Also, part of the results in Morelli, 1999, concern a
similar model without equilibrium minority governments (Proposition 4, page 816).
1Schoﬁeld, 1993, 1995, considers a generalized cooperative solution concept, the heart.
2Conditions for their existence are discussed by, e.g., McKelvey and Schoﬁeld, 1986, Banks, 1995, and Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1990.
5Badyopadhyay and Oak, 2004, consider a single period coalition formation model, assum-
ing that formateurs propose one among a ﬁnite number of coalitions, with the agreement to be
implemented by any coalition restricted to an exogenously ﬁxed compromise. They derive condi-
tions that induce or preclude minority governments, as do Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, in a model
that also addresses the stability of these governments. They work with three parties and a two-
dimensional policy space, identical to that of Example 1 in the present study, but assume that
utility is transferable. These utility transfers (negative or positive) are not construed as the divi-
sion of cabinet positions among parties under their assumptions. Diermeier and Merlo deﬁne the
coalition of parties receiving cabinet portfolios as the ‘proto-coalition’ that eventually oﬀers the
ﬁnal government proposal. In order for minority governments to form, extra-cabinet parties (those
excluded from the ‘proto-coalition’) must receive compensation in the form of non-policy transfers3
in order to support the minority cabinet. Baron and Diermeier, 2001, use a similar formal deﬁnition
of a government in a related model but do not obtain equilibrium minority governments, as they
restrict transfers only among parties in the proto-coalition.
We shall now proceed to the main part of the analysis. We start in the following section
by presenting the model. Next, we show that this model produces majority governments with
probability one in the absence of signiﬁcant policy disagreement. In the penultimate section we
establish the advertised result concerning minority governments, and further discuss its interpreta-
tion and robustness questions. We conclude in the last section. All proofs have been relegated to
an Appendix.
2 Government Formation Bargaining
We assume a parliament consisting of n ≥ 3 parties and denote the set of these parties by
N = {1,...,n}. Each party i has a positive share of seats in parliament equal to si > 0 and no single
party controls a parliamentary majority, i.e., we have
Pn
i=1 si = 1 and si ≤ 1
2 for every party i. A
government must receive the support of some coalition, C ⊆ N, that controls a majority of seats
(
P
i∈C si > 1
2) in order to be invested. Parties bargaining over the formation of a government must
agree on a policy x ∈ X. The policy space X is a subset of the d-dimensional Eucledian space Rd,
d ≥ 1, that encompasses all the public policies that can be pursued by any cabinet. In addition to
the policy to be pursued by the government, bargaining parties must also agree on the allocation
3These transfers to parties outside the government have to take the form of private goods other than cabinet oﬃce:
if these ‘bribes’ were cabinet oﬃce, then these parties should be considered part of the cabinet.
6of portfolios, which we represent as a vector g = (g1,g2,...,gn) ∈ Rn that satisﬁes gi ≥ 0 for each
party i and
Pn
i=1 gi = G > 0. Hence, we deﬁne a government as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A government is a pair (x,g) consisting of a policy x, and an allocation of cabinet
portfolios g.
We distinguish minority governments from majority governments using the default empirical
criterion, i.e., whether cabinet portfolios are allocated only among parties that control a minority
of seats in parliament:
Deﬁnition 2 A government (x,g) is a minority government if the set of parties that receive posi-
tive share of cabinets is not a winning coalition, i.e., if
P
i∈C si ≤ 1
2 where C is the coalition of all
the parties with positive portfolio allocation, gi > 0.
Of course, if a government (x,g) is not a minority government, then it is a majority government. We
emphasize that a minority government must still be approved (or tolerated) by a winning coalition.
In each period t = 1,2,... before the attainment of an agreement party i becomes the
formateur with probability πi, where
Pn
i=1 πi = 1. When party i is the formateur in period t, it
proposes a government. If this proposal is accepted by a winning coalition, the game ends with the
formation of that government. Otherwise the game moves to the next period and continues as above
until an agreement is reached. We shall assume that parties have preferences over governments given
by a utility function Ui that takes the form
Ui(x,g;ci) = ui(x,gi) + cigi. (1)
Party i discounts the future with a discount factor δi ∈ (0,1]. Thus, if a government (x,g) is
invested in period t, the payoﬀ of party i is given by δt−1
i Ui(x,g;ci).
We now impose a number of assumptions on the policy space, partisan preferences, and the
bargaining protocol. First, we assume that the policy space X is convex and compact and can be
cut out by a ﬁnite number of concave functions. Also, the function ui : X ×R+ → R is smooth and
concave and satisﬁes ui(x,gi) > 0, for all parties i and all x,gi. We strengthen concavity over the
policy component of ui’s arguments by requiring that for any porfolio allocation gi, the function
ui has negative deﬁnite second derivative, D2
xui(x,gi). This assumption implies that, for each gi,
party i has a unique ideal policy that maximizes ui over policies in X. We denote this ideal policy
by ˆ xi(gi) and we require some political disagreement when parties’ cabinet portfolio allocations
7are zero, so that ˆ xi(0) 6= ˆ xj(0) for all distinct parties j and i. When it comes to preferences over
cabinets we assume that party i’s utility is strictly increasing with its portfolio allocation, so that
ui satisﬁes
∂ui(x,gi)
∂gi > 0 for all x ∈ X, and that ci ∈ (0,c) for some c > 0. We mildly restrict
the form of interaction between policies and portfolio allocations implied by ui by requiring that
the marginal utility from cabinet oﬃce is bounded and independent of policies at zero portfolio
allocation, i.e., that
∂ui(x,0)
∂gi = mi < +∞ for all x ∈ X. We require that for every winning coalition




−1 Dxuj(x,0) = 0, (2)
and x is in the interior of X. We assume that πi = 0 if party i is a dummy party4 and that πi > 0
for every party i that is not a dummy party. Lastly, we require that if party i is not a dummy
party, then for every winning coalition C such that coalition C\{i} is also a winning coalition, there
exists j ∈ C, j 6= i, such that C \ {j} is also a winning coalition. The last two assumptions ensure
that a formateur is not redundant in any winning coalition in which no other coalition partner is
redundant.
We have now speciﬁed the model and this is a good point to pause in order to comment on
some of the assumptions we have imposed and their interpretation. A central focus of the analysis
to follow will be on the eﬀect of changes in cabinet parameter G on the types of governments that
form in equilibrium. As we vary this parameter, holding everything else constant, we vary the
signiﬁcance of the oﬃce component in parties’ utility. This interpretation is most obvious if we
recast the model in the following equivalent way: we may represent the division of cabinet portfolios
by a vector σ ∈ [0,1]n with
Pn
i=1 σi = 1, so that σi represents party i’s share of cabinet posts, and
reexpress party i’s utility as Ui(x,Gσ;ci). An application of the chain rule of diﬀerentiation then
reveals that increases in G simultaneously increase the positive utility eﬀect of a given portfolio
allocation for all recipient parties. Of course, cabinet oﬃce can be signiﬁcant only relative to other
sources of utility so that, in the model, lower G can be interpreted either as an aggregate decrease
of the signiﬁcance of cabinet oﬃce as a source of utility compared to policy, or as an increase in
policy disagreement or polarization. We have also introduced parameters ci, that regulate individual
parties’ marginal preference for cabinets. These parameters will serve to make precise the notion
that minority governments occur generically, by allowing us to perturb parties’ preferences away
4A party i is a dummy party if coalition C \ {i} is a winning coalition whenever coalition C is winning.
8from singular speciﬁcations of the model. The reader may wonder whether there is any redundancy
by the inclusion of both G and ci as parameters of the model, which is not generally the case since
ui need not be linear in gi.5
We shall restrict the analysis to the study of no delay stationary subgame perfect (SSP)
Nash equilibria, in pure or mixed strategies. By no delay we mean that parties becoming formateurs
propose a government that is invested with probability one. We also impose a standard restriction
on voting strategies that ensures that parties vote on proposed agreements as if they are pivotal,
i.e., they approve governments that they strictly prefer over their expected utility if the game
continues in the next round and reject governments when they have the reverse strict preference.
Since the class of SSP equilibria we study forms a subset of the set of subgame perfect equilibria,
minority governments can certainly emerge in a subgame perfect equilibrium if they can emerge in
a stationary equilibrium. Thus, the restriction to stationary equilibria makes our task harder in
what follows. We can readily check that this government formation model satisﬁes the assumptions
of Banks and Duggan, 2000. As a consequence, there exists at least one equilibrium. We emphasize
that the game may (and in general does) admit multiple equilibria.
3 Majority Governments
The main goal of this section is to show that only majority governments can form in equi-
librium if the cabinet parameter G is too high, i.e., if the impact of an increase in parties’ cabinet
shares is high relative to the eﬀect of a change in policies. In the second part of this section, we
show that the policy agreements reached by majority governments satisfy certain necessary con-
ditions. We will use these necessary conditions in order to show that minority governments occur
generically for low G in the next section. Accordingly, the ﬁrst result is:
Proposition 1 Fix utility functions ui, preference parameters ci, seat shares si, recognition prob-
abilities πi, and discount factors δi. There exists G such that for every G > G, all equilibrium
governments are majority governments in all equilibria of the corresponding government formation
game.
Proposition 1 ensures that in parliamentary systems with small policy polarization or parties
for which cabinet portfolios are a (relatively) signiﬁcant source of utility, majority governments are
5In any case, both Propositions 1 and 2 in the sequel state properties of the equilibrium correspondence as we
vary G, for ﬁxed (generic) values of ci.
9guaranteed to occur with probability one. Loosely speaking, the argument relies on the fact that if,
by increasing G, we increase the size of the pie to be distributed among parties in the form of spoils
from the control of cabinet oﬃce, parties’ expected utility if they prolong the negotiations by one
more period increases. This is because proposing parties are guaranteed to be able to get a share of
that augmented pie in the event they become the formateur party in the next period. Since parties
expect more in the next period if negotiations are prolonged, they must receive higher compensation
in the present period in order to approve a government and terminate the negotiations. But there
is an upper bound on the utility that parties can extract from public policies, without receiving
any cabinets. As a result, there exists some level of G above which parties must receive cabinets in
order to approve any government, even if this government implements their ideal policy. For such
high G, the only possible governments are majority governments.
Continuing the study of majority governments, we now characterize the types of policy
compromises that prevail whenever majority governments form in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 If a majority government (x,g) proposed by party i forms in equilibrium and the set of
parties receiving cabinet portfolios is given by C, then i ∈ C, all parties j ∈ C,j 6= i, are indiﬀerent










Thus, the policy compromises pursued by majority governments maximize a weighted av-
erage of political parties’ utilities. Note that these policies are not independent of the attained
portfolio allocation, g, since the maximizer of (3) varies with that portfolio allocation compromise.
As is evident from the proof of Lemma 1, the result follows simply from the optimization consid-
erations of formateurs. In the next section, we use this necessary condition in order to show that
minority governments must occur when G is low, for almost all parameters of the model.
4 Minority Governments
In the previous section we showed that there exists some level of cabinet parameter G > 0
such that only majority governments form in all equilibria of the associated game for all G > G. In
this section we wish to show a partial converse, i.e., that there exists some G > 0 with G≤ G such
10that for all G <G minority governments form with positive probability in all equilibria of the game.
Figure 1 gives a graphic rendition of the comparative static we wish to establish. Note that we allow
the cutoﬀ point G to be strictly smaller than G, a consequence of the fact that the model typically
admits multiple equilibria: it is possible that for G in a range G< G < G, minority governments
form with positive probability in some equilibria but not in others. Yet, despite allowing for this
range of indeterminacy, the above formalization, if true, establishes the main substantive conclusion
of the analysis.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
In order to allow the reader to develop intuition for the reasons why we might expect such
a result to hold, we now analyze an example. The conﬁguration of party policy preferences in this
example is a focal case in Baron, 1991, and is assumed by Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, and Baron
and Diermeier, 2001. The example diﬀers from the former study in that in the present model
we explicitly introduce portfolio allocations, in addition to policies, as part of the government
agreement, and from the latter two studies because we do not assume transferable utility.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
Example 1 Let the space of policies be of dimension d = 2. Assume n = 3 parties with quadratic
policy preferences given by6
Ui(x,g) = ˜ ui(x) + gi = p2 − (x1 − ˆ xi
1)2 − (x2 − ˆ xi
2)2 + gi, i = 1,2,3.
Parties’ ideal policy points lie at the corners of an equilateral triangle as shown in Figure 2(a), and





2 ), ˆ x2 = (0,0), and ˆ x3 = (0,p), where p > 0. Probabilities of recognition
and discount factors are given by πi = 1
3 and δi = δ for every party i, respectively. There exists a
pure strategy equilibrium in this game,7 which is displayed in Figure 2(a), such that proposing party
1 coalesces with party 2, party 2 with party 3, and party 3 with party 1. The equilibrium policy
proposal yi oﬀered by party i coalescing with party j is given by
x{i,j} = yi = 1
2ˆ xi + 1
2ˆ xj,
6The linear term cigi is implicitly incorporated in the term ....+gi, while we can easily determine the feasible set
X so that solutions to (2) lie in its interior.
7There exists a second pure strategy equilibrium that is identical to the above except parties coalesce in reverse
order (party 1 with 3, 3 with 2, and 2 with 1); and there also exists a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria in which
proposals are appropriate mixtures of proposals in the two pure strategy equilibria.
11when G ≥ ˜ G =
p2(9−7δ)
4δ , while it is a policy closer to the ideal point of party i when G < ˜ G.
Minority governments such that proposing party i sets gi = G, form with probability one when
G ≤ ˜ G. Majority governments form with probability one when G > ˜ G.
Example 1 constitutes a sharp illustration of the comparative statics we outlined in Figure
1. For high policy polarization or low cabinet parameter G ≤ ˜ G, we get minority governments (in
fact with probability one), while we only get majority governments when G is above that value.
Figure 2(b) displays the change in equilibrium policy compromises as a function of the parameter G.
In order to understand the dependence of the equilibrium outcome on parameters, we now consider
(without loss of generality) the calculus of parties 1 and 2, with party 1 being the proposing party.
Party 1 wishes to propose a government that maximizes its utility and obtains the support of party
2. Keeping with the notation in the example, we denote by y1, y2, and y3 the policies that prevail
in equilibrium. Then, by rejecting a proposal from party 1, party 2 expects to receive
1
3˜ u2(y1) + 1
3˜ u2(y2) + 1
3˜ u2(y3) + G
3 , (4)
one period later. Here we make use of the symmetry of the equilibrium in order to infer that, in
expectation, party 2 receives one third of the cabinets, G
3 , in the next period.
Now suppose that we have an equilibrium in which majority governments prevail with prob-
ability one. From Lemma 1 in the previous section, we must have yi = x{i,j}, where policies x{i,j}
maximize (3) for a majority government coalition by parties i and j, and are depicted graphically in
Figure 2(a).8 Using the expression in (4) we deduce a contradiction to our hypothesis that majority
governments form when
˜ u2(x{1,2}) ≥ δ(1
3˜ u2(x{1,2}) + 1
3˜ u2(x{2,3}) + 1
3˜ u2(x{3,1}) + G
3 ), (5)
since in this case party 2 is willing to approve a policy at x{1,2} without receiving any cabinets.
A substantive interpretation of condition (5) is most clearly obtained if we set δ = 1, whence
inequality (5) is equivalent to
˜ u2(x{1,2}) − ˜ u2(x{3,1}) ≥ G. (6)
8These compromises are independent of the exact portfolio allocation, g, due to the fact that party preferences in
Example 1 are quasi-linear.
12If we ﬁx the location of political parties (hence the location of compromises x{i,j}), then the above
condition is met when G is small. But another interpretation is that, for given G, condition
(6) is satisﬁed when the policy of a majority government in which party 2 does not participate,
x{3,1}, is close (in utility terms) to the corresponding policy in a majority government this party
participates, x{1,2}: in that case, party 2 is willing to accept a minority government with a policy
at x{1,2} without receiving any cabinets, because otherwise it faces the risk of a policy at x{1,3}
implemented by a coalition of parties 1 and 3 in the next period. In order to further highlight
the latter interpretation of condition (6) – that minority governments emerge in the presence of
signiﬁcant policy disagreement – consider what happens in Example 1 when parties’ ideal points
all coincide (when p = 0). Then compromises x{i,j} also coincide, and condition (6) fails for all
G > 0, so that all equilibrium governments are majority governments in the absence of political
disagreement.
Assuming some political disagreement, as we do in the model, our task is to show that the
above mechanism operates in more general bargaining environments. It turns out, though, that
we cannot rule out the possibility of knife-edge conﬁgurations of model parameters for which the
desired comparative static is not valid, because an inequality analogous to (5) fails for all G.9 Yet,
by combining certain continuity results established by Banks and Duggan, 2000, and Kalandrakis,
2006, we are able to establish that the mechanism illustrated by Example 1 operates generically.
We state this result in the next Proposition:
Proposition 2 Fix utility functions ui, seat shares si, and recognition probabilities, πi. For almost
all discount factors δi, and for almost all preference parameters ci, there exists G with G > 0 such
that for all G < G, minority governments form with positive probability in all equilibria of the
corresponding government formation game.
Before we conclude this section, we take some time to further clarify the implications of
Proposition 2, discuss empirical evidence and additional results under stronger assumptions, and
explore possible extensions and generalizations. A ﬁrst remark is that Proposition 2 only ensures
that in every equilibrium, minority governments occur with positive probability, not necessarily
with probability one. This is fortunate, as it allows for the possibility of political systems in which
both minority and majority governments occur with positive probability over time in the same
9An example of such a singularity is available in the Appendix.
13equilibrium. Minority governments may occur with probability one in an equilibrium, as in the
equilibrium of Example 1, but this is not always the case.
In the introduction, we argued that minority governments are paradoxical only if political
parties prefer more cabinet oﬃce to less, all else constant, and we insisted in imposing this re-
quirement in the analysis (requirement (b) in the introduction). It may then appear upon a ﬁrst
reading, that Propositions 1 and 2 run counter to that requirement, as they jointly yield minority
governments when the cabinet parameter G is small. But there is no real inconsistency between
Propositions 1 and 2 and requirement (b). In particular, requirement (b) is always imposed in the
model: parties prefer larger share of cabinet portfolios to less, all else equal, for all values of G > 0.
As we have already emphasized, requirement (b) has no implications for the relative importance of
oﬃce utility compared to policy disagreement, and it is such relative changes captured by changes
in cabinet parameter G that lead to the diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes in Propositions 1 and 2.
A related objection to Propositions 1 and 2 is the following: if we imprecisely read these
results to mean that minority governments occur only when cabinet oﬃce is not signiﬁcant, then
it is tempting to discount the importance of the results on the grounds that they are too intuitive.
If “intuitive” in this context means a result that is obviously true, then this objection has already
been addressed: we have already cautioned the reader that a naive statement of Proposition 2 has
a counterexample, and statements that have counterexamples cannot be obviously true.
More to the point, it is not the case that Propositions 1 and 2 jointly produce minority
governments only when cabinet posts are insigniﬁcant. Minority governments can emerge in the
model even if we ﬁx the absolute value of holding cabinet posts to an arbitrarily high level. For
that high level, we can increase the ideological distance between the policy compromises pursued
by diﬀerent coalitions in order to ensure that at least some equilibrium governments are minority
governments. This becomes obvious by increasing the diﬀerence ˜ u2(x{1,2})−˜ u2(x{3,1}) in inequality
(6) of Example 1. Thus, this critique of Proposition 2 can have merit only if the model yields
minority governments when cabinet posts have unrealistically small value relative to policy. To
dispel the latter possibility, consider Example 1, set p = 1, and note that for discount factor
δ = 9
11, we get G = ˜ G = 1. That means party 1 values cabinets so much that it is willing to
implement the ideal policy of another party in order to get all cabinets, instead of implementing
its own ideal policy without cabinets. For a smaller discount factor δ = 3
5, we get G = 2 so that
parties value holding cabinet oﬃce twice as much as moving policy from the ideal of their worst
opponent to their own ideal point. Although such trades may appear desirable for some individual
14politicians within parties, they seem highly inconsistent with partisan preferences and a pair of
parties that are ideologically far apart. Yet, in Example 1 we obtain minority governments with
probability one for any G < ˜ G under either pair of parameter speciﬁcations.
Intuitive or not, Propositions 1 and 2 are statements that are testable, and the pertinent
question is whether the theory put forth by Propositions 1 and 2 is corroborated by the data or not.
Do we observe more minority governments as parties get more ideologically polarized or as cabinet
oﬃce becomes less important as a source of party payoﬀs? A number of scholars have provided
evidence that is consistent with these predictions. For example, minority governments are more
likely in Scandinavian countries where political disagreement is marked, and where strong norms
of meritocracy in the public sector and a long tradition of scrutiny of the government by inde-
pendent bodies limit the spoils that political parties can extract from the tenure of cabinet posts.
Indridason, 2005, attributes the higher incidence of majority governments in Iceland compared to
other Scandinavian countries to the higher importance of cabinet oﬃce due to the prevalence of
clientelism practices. Furthermore, in ‘large n’ studies, Warwick, 1998, and Indridason, 2004, show
that minority governments are more likely to form when policy polarization increases or when cab-
inet oﬃce becomes more important, respectively. Sened, 1996, using data from Israel shows how
the emergence of minority governments there is related to the polarization of the party system.
Additional evidence involving more countries, and extensive review of the evidence can be found in
Sened and Schoﬁeld, 2006, whose monograph theoretically and empirically addresses both electoral
and coalition formation politics.
A ﬁnal comment is that Proposition 2 asserts the existence of threshold, G, below which
minority governments are guaranteed to occur with positive probability, but it does not explicitly
determine the magnitude of that threshold. As the statement of the Proposition implies, the
exact value of this threshold varies in general with the remaining aspects of the model (policy
preferences, recognition probabilities, etc.). If we are willing to impose stronger assumptions than
those maintained in the analysis so far, we can get a handle on such additional forces that may
determine that threshold, G. Speciﬁcally, by simple diﬀerentiation we get:
Result 1 Assume party payoﬀs, recognition probabilities, and seat shares as given in Example 1.
Then the threshold G below which minority governments occur decreases with parties’ common
discount factor, δ.
15The comparative static in Result 1 is straightforward. The range of values of cabinet parameter
G for which minority governments occur increases with parties’ impatience. As parties get more
impatient, their bargaining power decreases so that they are more willing to accept government
proposals that do not allocate them any cabinet portfolios, all else held constant.
The observation that minority governments emerge when formateurs deal with coalition
partners that have low bargaining power oﬀers a unifying interpretation of both Proposition 2 and
Result 1. In the case of Proposition 2, the weakness of the formateur’s coalition partners arises
from the polarization of the political system: if the formateur fails, then a government at the wrong
side of the political spectrum may emerge implementing very undesirable policies, thus generating
an incentive to accept minority governments instead. Result 1 identiﬁes another potential source
of weakness for the formateur’s coalition partners, i.e., their impatience. In either case, rather
than being weak and feeble governing solutions, minority governments arise as a consequence of the
strength of the formateur’s party vis a vis its coalition partners. This strength supports theoretically
what we already know empirically, i.e., that minority governments can be both stable and viable
governing solutions.
Extensions and Generalizations
Before we conclude, we brieﬂy discuss the possibility of extending the main results of the
analysis under diﬀerent assumptions. We have allowed interaction eﬀects between payoﬀs from
policy and positive portfolio allocations. These interaction eﬀects may represent, for example,
ministerial corruption such that cabinet members extract private beneﬁts by altering a public policy
(a contract, law, public oﬃce appointment, etc.), or the possibility that cabinet appointments have
policy implications as is assumed in a much stronger form by Laver and Shepsle (1990). We
thus generalized signiﬁcantly over the assumption of additive separability that is standard in the
literature.10 We barred interaction eﬀects between parties’ policy payoﬀ and the portfolio allocation
of other parties, a restriction that allowed a more transparent implementation of the assumption
that parties prefer larger share of portfolios to less. But we can admit a more general class of
preferences, by adding the entire vector of portfolio allocations to the arguments of utility function
ui(x,gi). The externalities represented by such a generalized function ui(x,g) can, for example,
capture the incentives that lead to the occurrence of surplus coalitions. Proposition 2 then still
10The even stronger assumption of quasi-linearity is imposed between policies and cabinets by, e.g., Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1988, Crombez, 1996, Morelli, 1999, and between policies and transfers by Diermeier and Merlo, 2000,
and Diermeier and Baron, 2001.
16holds if we mildly restrict the extent of these interactions at g = 0 portfolio allocations, as we do
in the present study.
The essence of the main argument admits further generalization. In particular, the main
ﬁndings extend directly to alternative government formation bargaining models, as long as they
satisfy certain continuity properties. One such generalization involves the related model of Banks
and Duggan, 2006, who relax the assumption that agreements are desirable by adding a status quo
policy that is implemented each period coalition negotiations fail.11 Focusing on alternative bar-
gaining protocols, Baron and Diermeier, 2001, and Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, propose a bargaining
game that allows formateur parties to select proto-coalitions which negotiate over agreements prior
to the resultant government being presented for an overt or tacit investiture vote. The analysis we
pursued is applicable directly in the case of such alternative bargaining protocols, but by employ-
ing the deﬁnition of government used in the present study, without assuming transferable utility
as these authors do.
5 Conclusions
We have derived a general, yet parsimonious theory for the emergence of minority and
majority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a sequential bargaining model
of coalition formation in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We established a compara-
tive static to the eﬀect that minority governments are (for almost all parameters) guaranteed to
emerge with positive probability when policy disagreement or polarization is signiﬁcant, or when
utility from cabinet posts is small relative to partisan policy disagreement. On the other hand,
only majority governments form when these conditions are reversed. Throughout the analysis we
maintained that cabinet oﬃce is valuable per se, and we avoided dimensionality or other ad priori
restrictions on the government agreements space. These ﬁndings are corroborated by a number of
independent empirical studies.
11Note that the two models coincide as discount factors δi → 1, for all i ∈ N.
17APPENDIX
In this appendix we prove the two Propositions and the Lemma stated in the main body of
the paper. Before we start, we introduce some necessary notation. We denote the set of portfolio





i∈N gi = G
	
. We also use vi to indicate the
continuation value of party i in an equilibrium, i.e., the expected utility of this party if the proposal
in the current round is rejected.
Proof of Proposition 1 Deﬁne ui = max{ui(x,0) : x ∈ X}. We ﬁrst claim that:
(1)Consider an equilibrium with discounted continuation values that satisfy δivi > ui for all parties
i ∈ N with πi > 0. All governments that form in that equilibrium are majority governments.
Suppose not. Then there exists equilibrium proposal (y,g) ∈ X × GG, a winning coalition C that
approve government (y,g), and a non-dummy party j ∈ C such that gj = 0. Then Uj (y,g;cj) =
uj (y,0) ≥ δjvj > uj, a contradiction.
We shall next show that:
(2) For each party i ∈ N with πi > 0, there exists Gi such that G > Gi ⇒ δivi > ui in every
equilibrium. Fix some player i and let ui = min{ui(x,0) : x ∈ X}. If (y,g) ∈ X × GG is the
expected value of proposals in an SSP equilibrium, we have δjvj ≤ Uj (y,g;cj), for all j ∈ N, due
to the concavity of uj. For government (y,g), let h 6= i be such that gh ≥ gj for all j ∈ N\{i},
i.e., h is the party with the highest expected portfolio allocation among parties other than i. Since
gh ≥
G−gi
n−1 we have gi + gh ≥ G
n−1. Thus, proposal (y,g0) ∈ X × GG with g0
j = gj if j 6= i,h,
g0
h = 0, and g0
i = gi + gh ≥ 1
n−1G, is approved by all parties except party h. Hence, party i
can guarantee her party a utility level Ui (y,g0;ci) when proposing. Thus, i’s continuation value











. Note that ui (y,0) ≥ ui for all y ∈ X.
Since πi > 0, δi ∈ (0,1], ci > 0, and
∂ui(y,gi)
∂gi > 0 for all y ∈ X, there exists Gi > 0 such
that δi












> ui for all G > Gi and all y ∈ X. As a result,
G > Gi ⇒ δivi > ui and we have completed the proof of step (2).
Set G = max

Gi | i ∈ N
	
. We now have G > G ⇒ δivi > ui for all i ∈ N with πi > 0,
in every equilibrium by step (2). But then only majority governments form for G > G in every
equilibrium, by step (1), and the proof of the Proposition is complete. QED
Next, we prove Lemma 1.
18Proof of Lemma 1 Let majority government (x,g) be proposed by party i in an equilib-
rium with continuation values vi,i ∈ N. We ﬁrst observe via standard arguments that
Uj (x,g;cj) = δjvj, for all j ∈ C \ {i}, (7)
which follows from the fact that
∂uh(x,gh)
∂gh + ch > 0,
∂uh(x,gh)
∂gl = 0 for all x ∈ X, l 6= h, h,l ∈ N.
Speciﬁcally, if Uj(x,g;cj) > δjvj, j ∈ C \ {i}, then by the continuity of Uj(x,g;cj) it is possible
to reduce gj and increase gi (and party i’s utility) with the new government still being invested.
Similarly, if Uj(x,g;cj) < δjvj, j ∈ C \ {i} then it is possible to set gj = 0 and increase gi (and
party i’s utility) with the new government still being invested. Furthermore, the same arguments
and the fact that the proposing party i cannot be redundant in any winning coalition in which no
other party is redundant ensure that i ∈ C, i.e., the proposing party is included among the parties
receiving cabinets.
Now suppose x does not maximize the objective in (3). First we show that x must be at








Dxuj(x,gj) · v = d > 0.










for all j ∈ C, set dj = 0 for all j / ∈ C and note that
P
j∈N dj = 0. Thus, set a direction of change for
g given by d = (d1,...,dn), and consider the eﬀect that a change of (x,g) in the feasible direction
(v,d) has on Uj(x,g;cj):














for all j ∈ C, which is a contradiction: government (x,g) cannot be optimal for formateur i ∈ C
since there exists a feasible direction that improves all coalition partners’ payoﬀ. Thus, x is a local
maximizer of (3). Since the latter is strictly concave as the sum of strictly concave functions, x is
also a global maximizer over alternatives in X. QED
Before we prove Proposition 2 we prove a second Lemma. The gist of that Lemma is
illustrated graphically in Figure 3. This Figure displays a two-dimensional policy space and the
19ideal policy points of members of two winning coalitions with party i belonging in both coalitions.
The two highlighted policy points display the policies that satisfy equations (2) for these two
coalitions. The Lemma, which is illustrated graphically in Figure Figure A1, establishes that for
almost all parameters (ci)i∈N∈(0,c)n these policies cannot lie on the same indiﬀerence contour of
players in the intersection of C and C0.
Lemma 2 Consider distinct majority coalitions C, C0. If distinct policies y,y0 satisfy (2) for
coalitions C and C0, respectively, then outside a measure zero set C(C,C0) ⊂ (0,c)n of parameters
(ci)i∈N, equations
Uj(y,0;cj) = Uj(y0,0;cj), for all j ∈ C ∩ C0,
are inconsistent.
Proof. Let ν = |C ∪ C0|. By assumption y,y0 ∈ int(X). Furthermore, since these policies are
distinct, we have (y,y0) ∈ (int(X) × int(X) − ∆), where ∆ is the diagonal of int(X)×int(X). Set
S = (int(X) × int(X) − ∆) × (0,c)ν and deﬁne |C ∩ C0| functions Fj : S → R2d+1, j ∈ C ∩ C0, to


















The ﬁrst 2d equations represent equations (2) for coalitions C and C0, respectively. The domain of
each Fj is the space of policies y, y0 and that of the |C ∪ C0| parameters ch, h ∈ C ∪C0, i.e., (0,c)ν.
Recall that z ∈ S is a critical point of mapping Fj if the Jacobian of Fj evaluated at z, DzFj(z),




j (0) : z is a critical point of Fj
o
.
We will ﬁrst show:
\
j∈C∩C0
Kj = ∅. (?)
Assume there exists z ∈ ∩j∈C∩C0Kj, instead, to get a contradiction. In what follows we index
parties using the convention q ∈ C \ C0, q0 ∈ C0 \ C, and l ∈ (C ∪ C0 − {j}). Calculating the












l al ... −w−2
q aq ... 0 ...
0 B −w−2
j bj −w−2



















ah = Dyuh (y,0), and bh = Dy0uh (y0,0). Note that by assumption wh > 0, h ∈ C∪C0. Performing







l al ... w−1
q aq ... 0 ...
0 B w−1
j bj w−1












Since A, B are negative deﬁnite, the above matrix has full rank if and only if the 1 × m matrix
















l bl ... w−1
q aq ... 0 ...
w−1
j bj w−1




has rank 1. Since z ∈ ∩j∈C∩C0Kj, we have z ∈ F−1
j (0) for all j, so that y and y0 satisfy equations

























Furthermore, since z ∈ ∩j∈C∩C0Kj, z is a critical point of each Fj, so we must have Mj(z) = 0
for all j ∈ C ∩ C0. Mj(z) = 0 means w−1
j aT
j A−1w−1
q aq = 0 for all q ∈ C \ C0 and all j ∈ C ∩ C0,
and we can obtain (by summing equations w−1
j aT
j A−1w−1
q aq = 0 ﬁrst over all q ∈ C \ C0 for each

























(mj + cj)−1Dyuj (y,0) = 0. (C)












Since (C) and (D) imply that y, y0 both maximize the strictly concave function
P
j∈C∩C0(mj + cj)−1uj(x,0), we must have y = y0, which is impossible since z ∈ ∩j∈C∩C0Kj ⊂ S.
This completes the proof of (?).
Now for each j ∈ C ∩ C0 deﬁne the map ˆ Fj : S \ Kj → R2d+1 to be the restriction of Fj on
S\Kj. Recall that 0 ∈ R2d+1 is a regular value of ˆ Fj if Dz ˆ Fj(z) has full rank for every z ∈ ˆ F−1
j (0).
Thus, since ˆ F−1
j (0)∩Kj = ∅ by construction, 0 ∈ R2d+1 is a regular value of ˆ Fj for all j ∈ C ∩C0.
Note that S is open and Kj is a (relatively) closed set for all j ∈ C ∩C0, so that S \Kj is an open
set for all j ∈ C ∩ C0. Thus, each ˆ Fj is a smooth mapping between smooth manifolds since S \ Kj
is open and uh is smooth. As a result, the Preimage theorem (Guilemin and Pollack, 1974, page
21) ensures that Rj = ˆ F−1
j (0) is a (2d + ν) − (2d + 1) = (ν − 1)-dimensional manifold.
We are now ready to conclude the proof of the Lemma. In order for z ∈ S to satisfy
Fj(z) = 0 for some j ∈ C ∩ C0 we must have z ∈ Rj ∪ Kj. It follows that in order for z ∈ S to




j∈C∩C0 Kj = ∅ by
(?), the set
T
j∈C∩C0(Rj ∪Kj) becomes the ﬁnite union of sets that are themselves the intersection
of |C ∩ C0| sets, at least one of which is a (ν − 1)-dimensional manifold. Thus,
T
j∈C∩C0(Rj ∪ Kj)
is itself at most (ν − 1)-dimensional. This is one dimension smaller than the space of parameters

















= 0,j ∈ C ∩ C0,
are consistent only for a set of measure zero C(C,C0) of parameters ch, h ∈ N. Since Uj(x,0;cj) =
uj(x,0), the proof is complete.
22We can now prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2 Fix any πi,si,ui, i ∈ N, consistent with our assumptions. We break
the proof into four steps:
(1) For all discount factors (δi)i∈N outside a measure zero set D ⊂ (0,1]
n, there is a ﬁnite number
of pure strategy equilibria in the game with G = 0. These equilibria are independent of (ci)i∈N ∈
(0,c)n. The game with G = 0 satisﬁes condition (A1) of Lemma 2, page 318, of Kalandrakis, 2006.
Thus, the number of pure strategy equilibria of this game is ﬁnite by Theorems 3(i), page 323, and
Theorem 5, page 325, of Kalandrakis, 2006, for almost all discount factors. Clearly, parameters
(ci)i∈N ∈ (0,c)n do not aﬀect the equilibrium set of the game with G = 0. Thus, step 1 is proved.
In what follows, we will say that a sequence of equilibria ek, one for each version of the
game with G = Gk > 0, is minority barring if all governments proposed in each equilibrium ek are
majority governments. We ﬁrst conclude:
(2) Consider a sequence Gk → 0 and an associated minority barring sequence of equilibria ek → e.
e is an equilibrium of the game with G = 0, and for every party i with πi > 0, if i proposes
policy y ∈ X in equilibrium e, then y satisﬁes equations (2) for some majority coalition C with
i ∈ C. The fact that e is an equilibrium follows from the upper-hemicontinuity of the equilibrium
correspondence (Banks and Duggan, 2000, Theorem 3, page 81). Suppose party i proposes policy
y ∈ X in equilibrium e. Since only majority governments form in every equilibrium ek, there exists
a subsequence (still indexed by k), ek → e, a corresponding sequence of majority governments
(yk,gk) → (y,0) that are in the support of party i’s proposal strategy in equilibrium ek, and a ma-
jority coalition C with i ∈ C, such that gh,k > 0 for all h ∈ C and gh,k = 0 for all h / ∈ C. By Lemma
1 and the Theorem of the Maximum we deduce that y maximizes
P
j∈C (mj + cj)
−1 uj(y,0), which




−1 Dxuj(x,0) = 0.
We deduce that x = y is the unique maximizer satisfying equations (2) which coincide with the
ﬁrst order conditions for a maximum of (3) at g = 0.
Lemma 2 allows us to show:
(3) Fix any ci,i ∈ N, outside a measure zero set C∗ ⊂ (0,c)n of parameters (ci)i∈N. Consider a
sequence Gk → 0 and an associated minority barring sequence of equilibria ek → e. Equilibrium
23e is in pure strategies. Suppose equilibrium e is in mixed strategies so that two distinct policies
y,y0 ∈ X lie in the support of some party i’s proposal strategy with πi > 0. Then, by the
same argument used in the previous step, there exists a subsequence (still indexed by k), ek → e,
corresponding sequences of majority governments (yk,gk) → (y,0),(y0
k,g0
k) → (y0,0), that are in
the support of party i’s proposal strategy in equilibrium ek, and distinct winning coalitions C and
C0, i ∈ C ∩ C0, such that gh,k > 0 and g0
q,k > 0 if and only if h ∈ C, q ∈ C0, and
Uj(yk,gk;cj) = Uj(y0
k,g0
k;cj), for all j ∈ C ∩ C0,
for all k. The indiﬀerence of all players j ∈ C ∩ C0 follows from the fact the the proposer i mixes
between proposals (yk,gk),(y0
k,g0
k) and leaves all cabinet recipient parties indiﬀerent between its
proposal and their continuation value in equilibrium ek (equations (7) in the proof of Lemma 2).









−1 Dyuj(y0,0) = 0
Uj(y,0;cj) = Uj(y0,0;cj), for all j ∈ C ∩ C0.
Lemma 2 guarantees this is impossible outside a measure zero set C(C,C0). Since there exists a
ﬁnite number of possible pairs of distinct winning coalitions C, C0, and ﬁnite unions of sets of
measure zero have measure zero, outside a measure zero set of parameters C∗ ⊂ (0,c)n, equilibrium
e must be in pure strategies. This completes the proof of step 3.
The last step is:
(4) Fix any policy x ∈ X. For all (ci)i∈N outside a measure zero set C(x) ⊂ (0,c)n, x does not
satisfy (2) for any winning coalition C. Since |C| ≥ 2 for any winning coalition C, and parties’




−1 Dxuj(x,0) = 0,
24is a lower dimensional set (since Dxuj(x,0) 6= 0 for at least |C| − 1 parties j ∈ C). So the claim
follows since there are only a ﬁnite number of possible majority coalitions C, and ﬁnite unions of
sets of measure zero have measure zero.
We are now ready to conclude the proof of the Proposition. Fix any discount factors
(δh)h∈N / ∈ D. By Step 1, party i, πi > 0, may propose at most a ﬁnite number of policies
{x1,...,xτ}, which are independent of (ch)h∈N, in any of the τ ≥ 0 pure strategy equilibria of the
game with G = 0. Consider any parameter (ch)h∈N ∈ (0,c)n, outside the measure zero set
C = C∗ ∪ C(x1) ∪ ... ∪ C(xτ).
Suppose that there is no G> 0 such that minority governments form with positive probability in
all equilibria of the game when 0 ≤ G <G. In other words, the working hypothesis is that for each
G > 0 there exists some G0 with G > G0 > 0 for which an equilibrium exists with all proposed
governments being majority governments. Then there is a sequence Gk → 0 and an associated
minority barring sequence of equilibria ek. By going to a subsequence if necessary, we have ek → e,
and the limit e is an equilibrium by Step 2. Since (ch)h∈N / ∈ C∗, e is a pure strategy equilibrium
by Step 3, so that party i proposes one of policies x ∈ {x1,...,xτ}. Step 2 ensures that this policy
solves (2) for some winning coalition C with i ∈ C. But this is impossible by Step 4, since we
have assumed that (ch)h∈N / ∈ C. Thus, for almost all discount factors, and almost all parameters
(ch)h∈N, there exists G > 0 such that minority governments form with positive probability in every
equilibrium of the game with G < G. QED
In the last part of this Appendix we shall show that it is possible to specify instances of the
model that satisfy all maintained assumptions and admit equilibria without minority governments
for all positive levels of cabinet parameter, G > 0.
Counter-Example: Let the space of policies be of dimension d = 2 and set X to be the square
deﬁned by points (0,b), (b,0), (0,−b), and (−b,0). Assume n = 4 parties with equal share of seats
in parliament si = 1
4, i = 1,...,4 and preferences given by
Ui (x,g) = p −
 





x2 − ˆ xi
2
2
+ gi, i = 1,3, and
Ui (x,g) = p − a
 





x2 − ˆ xi
2
2
+ gi, i = 2,4,
25where ˆ x1 = (0,1), ˆ x2 = (1,0), ˆ x3 = (0,−1), and ˆ x4 = (−1,0). Probabilities of recognition and
discount factors are identical and given by πi = 1
4 and δi = δ ∈ (6
7,1) for all i ∈ N, respectively.
Set the weight a ∈ (0, 7δ−6
6−5δ), the constant p at
p =
2a(1 + a)(4 + a) − δa(8 + 9a + 3a2)
2(2 + a)2(1 − δ)
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Key: Since the bargaining game may admit multiple equilibria, it is possible that in some 
intermediate range of cabinet spoils (G, G) a subset of equilibria involve minority 
governments and the rest do not.   31
G
Figure 2: Minority and Majority Governments in Example 1 
 
(a)                                                                           
1 ˆ x 
  
               Policy of minority                        
1 y                        
            government by party 1                                                
 
   
                                                      { } 2 , 1 x                                       { } 1 , 3 x 
             Policy of majority  
    government by parties 1 & 2                                                                
 




                                      
2 ˆ x             
2 y                    { } 3 , 2 x                               













      Minority  
                                                                                                              governments 








Key: (a) The (unconstrained) ideal policies of the three parties are located at the vertices 
of the equilateral triangle. The highlighted points are different policies proposed in 
equilibrium for different values of parameter G. 
(b) For G below G ~, minority governments form and policies are leveraged toward the 
ideal point of the formateur. For G above that level, only majority governments form with 
policies at the midpoint between the ideal points of the two parties in government.                                                                           32
 Figure A1: Graphic Illustration of Lemma 2 
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Key: Policy y represents the solution to equations (2) for coalition C = {i, j, l, h} , while 
policy y’  represents the respective policy for coalition C = {i, m, k}. There exists a 
perturbation of parties’ preference parameters c, that ensures that the two policies do not 
fall on the same indifference contour of party  C C i ′ ∈ I . 
 